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INTEGRATION SINCE THE 1950s
Peter L. Lindseth *
I. INTRODUCTION'
It is common for legal scholars to invoke European integration
as perhaps the most advanced example of the "constitutionalization"
of a supranational legal order.2 The specifically constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law;
B.A., J.D., Comell; Ph.D. (history), Columbia. I would like to thank my
colleagues at Connecticut, especially Jeremy Paul, Hugh Macgill, Angel
Oquendo, Steven Wilf, Paul Berman, Pat McCoy, Tom Morawetz, and Carol
Weisbrod, for extremely helpful comments during a faculty workshop in which
I presented an earlier draft of this essay. I would also like to thank several
members of the faculty at Columbia, notably Volker Berghahn, George
Berma=n, Walter Mattli, and Robert Paxton, who provided very incisive
comments on the longer work on which this contribution is based (see infra
note 1). © Peter L. Lindseth. All rights reserved.
1. This essay draws primarily from Peter L. Lindseth, The Contradictions
of Supranationalism: European Integration and the Constitutional Settlement of
Administrative Governance, 1920s-1980s (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
History, Columbia University, 2002) (on file with author), which contains
further discussion of the historical evidence supporting the interpretation
advanced here.
2. In this symposium, see, for example, Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional
Analogies in the International Legal System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) (noting "the powerful
example of European constitutionalism" which he says "suggest[s] that 'a
conventional treaty regime, once endowed with a judicial mechanism for
interpretation and enforcement, can be converted by degrees to a genuine
constitutional order"'), quoting Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis,
Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a
Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 239 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds.,
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character of the European Union (EU) remains, however, deeply
ambiguous. On the one hand, European institutions have been built,
historically, on the foundations of administrative governance as it has
developed on the national level for more than half a century.3 In
particular, the decision making procedures in the EU have depended,
to an extraordinary degree, on the constitutional predominance of the
national executive in the postwar administrative state-not merely as
a "legislator" in its own right but also as the first line of democratic
legitimation over policy-making in the administrative sphere,
whether national or supranational. European integration has further
depended on the political and institutional ascendence within the
administrative sphere of the technocrat, whose primary bases for
legitimacy were a combination of seemingly "depoliticized"
expertise, ministerial oversight, as well as a (judicially-enforced)
respect for the tenets of administrative legality. In transferring
authority to executive and technocratic institutions on the
supranational level, European integration has built on a kind of
"enabling legislation" in a new guise-the various Community (and
now Union) treaties and related agreements-which, like enabling
legislation on the national level, did not specify most regulatory
norms directly but rather delegated this normative power to
executive and technocratic institutions, albeit ones which now
extended beyond the strict confines of the nation-state.
As in the domestic administrative state, however, European
integration has required an important judicial mechanism to ensure
that all the relevant parties do not defect from their legal
commitments under the enabling legislation. This judicial
"commitment mechanism," in its supranational form, has entailed not
merely judicial review of the legality of Community norms but also,
somewhat more unexpectedly, scrutiny of the conformity of Member
State laws with the goals of market integration as set forth in the
treaties. It was in the exercise of its commitment function that the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) began its four-decade effort to
"constitutionalize" Europe's supranational institutions. According to
the major constitutionalizing decisions of the Court since the early
1960s, these institutions should be understood, legally at least, as a
2001).
3. For more detail, see Lindseth, supra note 1, Introduction to Part II.
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constitutional level of governance in a federal-type system, rather
than as an extension of administrative governance on the national
level. In the Court's alternative vision, Europe's supranational
institutions have come to embody or represent the authority of a new
and autonomous political community over and above the Member
States, one whose authority is necessarily superior to national
political institutions, at least in those regulatory domains transferred
to the supranational level.
These contradictory dimensions of European
supranationalism-the administrative seemingly dependent upon,
and the constitutional assertedly independent of, national
governmental structures-is linked to another kind of historical
disconnect in the nature of integration. The scope of the EU's
normative power has undoubtedly increased dramatically over fifty
years, and yet the governing legitimacy of the supranational
institutions that exercise this power has remained stubbornly "weak"
as compared to the constitutional structures of the Member States.4
For better or worse, national constitutional bodies have continued to
enjoy a much stronger legitimacy owing to their role as political-
cultural embodiments of the sovereignty of their national political
community ("people," "demos"), even as they have transferred ever
broader normative powers to the EU.5 By contrast, the legitimacy of
4. See Peter L. Lindseth, 'Weak' Constitutionalism? Reflections on
Comitology and Transnational Governance in the European Union, 21
OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 145 (2001) [hereinafter 'Weak' Constitutionalism].
5. I am not insisting on an unalterable historical role, true in all times.
Rather, I am simply noting that, for the last century at least (indeed longer in
several European countries), the prevalent conceptions of democracy have
been intimately bound up with the idea that there must exist certain bodies
historically "constituted" by the "people" (most importantly, but not
exclusively, a parliament) that are broadly perceived to embody or express the
capacity of a historically cohesive political community-a "demos"-to rule
itself. This historically-grounded condition may carry with it all sorts of
negative implications and consequences; nevertheless, as a cultural
presupposition, it retains a capacity to order thinking and to give meaning to
social and political action affecting whether and how a regulatory regime is
experienced as a "constitutional democracy." On the relationship of
experience and meaningful political action, see E.P. THOMPSON, History and
Anthropology, in MAKING HISTORY: WRITINGS ON HISTORY AND CULTURE
200, 222 (1994) (revised version of a lecture given at The Indian History
Congress on Dec. 30, 1976, arguing in an analogous context: "[H]istorical
change eventuates . . . because changes in productive relationships are
Fall 2003]
366 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:363
Europe's supranational institutions, in the absence of a "people" or
"demos" of their own, often appears to be little more than that of an
administrative "fourth branch of government" hi l'amgricaine6- -
normatively independent in important respects, but also dependent
on national constitutional structures as the ultimate source for their
governing legitimacy.
The aim of this essay is to put forward an historiographical
framework to better comprehend the complex interactions of the
administrative and constitutional dimensions of European integration
over time.7 Because of my historical focus, this essay will not dwell
on perhaps the most prominent recent effort at European
"constitutionalization": the draft constitutional treaty recently
produced by the Convention on the Future of the European Union
(the "European Convention").8 Nevertheless, a brief glance at the
constitutional treaty may be worthwhile, because it suggests the
extent to which tensions between the administrative and
constitutional dimensions of European integration (tensions with
deep historical roots) persist to this day, even in a treaty so intently
experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men's ideas and their
values, and argued through their actions, their choices and their beliefs")
(emphasis added). Rather than focusing on productive relationships, as
Thompson did, I am focusing on how changing structures of public
governance are "experienced" in relation to historically-rooted ideas and
values of constitutional democracy. Those ideas and values obviously evolve
historically in relation to the changing structures of governance, but my basic
premise is that prevailing ideas and values of constitutional democracy have
remained attached to national institutions in Europe even as a great deal of
normative power has become increasingly supranationalized.
6. Giandomenico Majone, The European Community: An "Independent
Fourth Branch of Government?," in VERFASSUNGEN FOR EIN ZMLES EUROPA
23 (Gert Brfiggemeier ed., 1994) [hereinafter Majone, The European
Community].
7. In particular, see infra Part III.
8. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003,
CONV 850/03, at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.
en03.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2003) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY].
This introductory discussion is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of
the draft treaty. For excellent overview, see Steve Peers, Statewatch:
Annotated Text of EU Constitution, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/
2003/aug/constitution.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (series of annotated texts
prepared for Statewatch by Professor Steve Peers of the University of Essex,
UK).
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focused on the constitutionalization of the supranational order in
Europe.
Given its great length and attention to procedural and policy
detail, one could easily confuse the proposed constitutional treaty
with an organic statute that any regulatory agency must possess, even
one with the institutional complexity and vast normative power of
the EU. 9 Up to this point, the various European treaties have served
this basic legal purpose, governing both the functioning of the EU's
supranational institutions while also regulating various important
legal relationships, notably between the Union and the Member
States, on the one hand, and between private parties, the Member
States and the Union, on the other. From this perspective, the
members of the Convention simply attempted to merge the existing
organic patchwork into a single legal document, calling the result a
"constitutional treaty." To characterize this approach as
"constitutionalization," however, is to use the term in a highly formal
sense. One could just as easily use "juridification," or even simply
"legalization," without making any normative claim that European
institutions have attained a political legitimacy separate and apart
from, or indeed superior to, the institutions of the Member States
(although such a claim is certainly not precluded).
There is, however, a second sense of "constitutionalization" that
is explicitly normative in its meaning, and it was this sense that was
arguably foremost in the minds of the members of the Convention as
they drafted the new constitutional treaty. This normative sense is
9. See, in particular, CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY, supra note 8, at Part III.
Although the broad descriptions of the competences of the Union in Part I may
seem to be of a "constitutional" character, the administrative character of the
document is preserved through the insertion of the lengthy and unwieldy Part
III. Of particular relevance in this regard is the provision in Part I which
states: "The scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union's
competences shall be determined by the provisions specific to each area in Part
III." Id. at art. 11(6). Rather than providing for a uniform legislative process
applicable to all areas of competence, the treaty set forth processes that are
both substantively and procedurally differentiated, as one would expect of a
piece of enabling legislation in the administrative state. Indeed, even the
choice of the term "competences," rather than the more basic and constitution-
sounding term "powers," is reflective of the bureaucratic character of Union
institutions. See DANIEL HALBERSTAM, FROM COMPETENCE TO POWER:
BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (Jurist EU:
Thinking Outside the Box Editorial Series, Paper No. 7/2003, 2003), at
http://www.fd.unl.pt/je/edit-pap.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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grounded in the belief that European institutions have come to
represent a new kind of political community over and above the
Member States, one which, at least for some purposes, aggregates all
of the various "peoples" of the Union into a single polity that
possesses an autonomous constitutional legitimacy of its own,
separate and apart from the Member States which comprise it.
Students of integration know that there is much in existing EU law
that already reflects this normative interpretation of Europe's
supranational institutions. Most importantly, this view has animated
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice since the early
1960s. When one looks at the Court's articulation of the doctrines of
direct effect and supremacy; its broad interpretation of the free
movement of goods, not to mention the other freedoms; its
fundamental-rights jurisprudence; or its supranational preference on
questions of "institutional balance," what one finds is a fairly
consistent effort on the part of the Court to establish Europe's
supranational institutions as a constitutionally autonomous level of
governance in a federal-type system. By the 1980s, the treaties had
become, in the Court's famous phrase, the "constitutional charter of a
Community based on the rule of law,"'10 in which the Court, as the
autonomous supranational institution par excellence, served as the
ultimate legitimating mechanism."
In this more normative understanding of European
"constitutionalization," one could say that the formal adoption of a
single constitutional treaty to replace the prior patchwork of
agreements is a recognition of a longstanding legal reality that, to
this point, was simply defined in the decisions of the Court itself.
Constitutionalization here is used in an evolutionary sense, referring
10. Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986
E.C.R. 1339, 1365 para. 23; see also Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-6102
para. 21; Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365, 1-3373, para. 16.
11. This self-understanding of the Court's role in fact has deep historical
roots. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 604 (opinion of
Advocate-General Lagrange) (claiming that citizens of the Member States "do
find within the Community legal system certain guarantees, in particular
through review by the Court, which, albeit not identical, are still comparable
to those which their own national system ensured [prior to the transfer of
jurisdiction under the Treaty] by the existence of a more extensive supremacy
of [their national] Parliament[s]") (emphasis added). For further discussion,
see Lindseth, supra note 1, at 366-69.
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to "a common-law type" process, to borrow Joseph Weiler's apt
phrase,12 rather than signifying some identifiable political moment
when a European constituent power (the ever elusive European
"demos") established autonomous supranational institutions to
embody or express the sovereignty of a new political community
apart from the Member States. The evolutionary interpretation
suggests that, over time, the various peoples of Europe have accepted
as a basic element of the acquis communautaire that the EU "now
constitutes a federal-type system in which two levels of legitimate
constitutional governance--one national and one supranational-
interact." 3
This process of Court-led, evolutionary constitutionalization has
always been troubled, however, by an absence of an explicit political
affirmation by the peoples of Europe that they actually intended to
create such a constitutionally autonomous level of governance at the
supranational level. Thus, the aim of the members of the European
Convention was also to break with this evolutionary
constitutionalization by forcing precisely the sort of political
affirmation that European integration has, up to this point, clearly
lacked. I will not judge whether this effort can, over time, be
successful. However, there is much in the history of European
integration that should make one extremely cautious. Although the
Convention clearly sought to imbue the governing treaty framework
with normatively constitutional terminology, one could fairly ask:
Will this effort lead to a fundamental change in the substance of
European public law, or will it prove to have the same sort of
ambiguous effect that earlier, formal gestures at
"constitutionalization" (in fact, ones stretching back to the 1950s)
ultimately proved to have?
12. J. H. H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 97, 126 (1997).
13. Peter Lindseth, Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing
the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity, in GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 157 (Joerges & Dehousse
eds., 2002) [hereinafter Delegation is Dead].
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II. FoRM AND SUBSTANCE: THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN
INSTRUMENTAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPRANATIONALISM IN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
It is important to recall that, beginning with the negotiation of
the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), the Member States have always shown a
willingness to create institutions in a seemingly constitutional fonn.1
4
The "executive" European Commission (originally the High
Authority), the "legislative" European Parliament (originally the
Assembly), and the "judicial" European Court of Justice all connoted
a desire to create a kind of "federal" government at the supranational
level. Nevertheless, despite this suggestion of a normatively
constitutional structure for a new political community in Europe, the
Member States (and, more particularly, their national executives)
also strived to maintain themselves as the driving political principals
in the supranational system.
The agent for this national political control at the supranational
level was originally the Council of Ministers, an institution whose
establishment was at first resisted by Jean Monnet and the other
drafters of the ECSC Treaty.' 5  Monnet saw the essence of
supranationalism as technocratic autonomy from even national
executive control. 16 However, much of the institutional politics of
14. Cf ANDREW MORAvcsiK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE
AND STATE POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 153 (1998) [hereinafter
THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE] (referring to the "quasi-constitutional form" of
Community institutions established in the 1950s).
15. See Lindseth, supra note 1, at 245-55.
16. Reflecting the technocratic mind-set of Jean Monnet-the principal
author of the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, calling for the
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community-the only institution
mentioned in the original French proposal was the High Authority itself. The
High Authority was to serve, in effect, as a kind of independent regulatory
agency of an extraordinarily novel type, one which exercised normative power
delegated from national parliaments, but which would otherwise be freed from
having its decisions subsequently mediated through national institutions
(notably via the national executive). The French insistence on an independent,
supranational regulatory authority was among the major reasons for the British
government's refusal to pursue the negotiations over the establishment of the
ECSC on the terms proposed by Schuman and Monnet in May 1950. The
French delegation to the negotiations (under Jean Monnet's leadership) was
only willing to contemplate the establishment of an assembly composed of
national parliamentary representatives which would have no legislative
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European integration in its first three decades would center around
the largely successful effort by national executives to assert their
hierarchical legal authority (either severally or collectively) over
Community rulemaking. In the early years of integration, the most
important manifestation of this effort was the dramatic shift in power
away from the High Authority under the Treaty of Paris of 1951 to
the Council of Ministers under the Treaty of Rome of 1957. This
effort would be continued with the Luxembourg Compromise of
1966, which perpetuated unanimous voting in the Council of
Ministers despite treaty provisions to the contrary, thus laying the
basis for a "veto culture" that would last another two decades.' 7 The
political centrality of the national executive in the institutions of
European integration was further confirmed in 1974 by the
establishment of the European Council. Composed of the heads of
state or government of the Member States and assembled in semi-
annual summit meetings, the European Council has operated as the
body responsible for giving overall political direction to the
Community and its institutions.
Thus, from a political perspective (at least until the middle
1980s), European integration involved less "a surrender of limited
areas of national sovereignty to the supranation,"'18 and more a
surrender of sovereignty by the national legislature to the national
executive, working in conjunction with its fellow national executives
in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, aided both by
national administrators at home as well as by a new supranational
function in the traditional sense, but would, consistent with shifting views on
the proper role of legislatures in the modem administrative state, be able to
"control" the High Authority through the right of censure by a supermajority of
two-thirds, after the High Authority's issuance of its annual report. This form
of limited parliamentary involvement was all that Monnet included in the
initial draft treaty presented to the other participating states as the sole basis for
further negotiations. Hans Jiirgen Kisters, Die Verhandlungen iiber das
institutionelle System zur Griindung der Europiischen Gemeinschaftfiir Kohle
und Stahl, in DIE ANFANGE DES SCHUMAN-PLANS 1950/51 79 (Klaus Schwabe
ed., 1988); DIRK SPIERENBURG & RAYMOND POIDEVIN, HISTOIRE DE LA
HAUTE AUTORITI DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPtENNE DU CHARBON ET DE
L'ACIER: UNE EXPtRIENCE SUPRANATIONALE, 16-17 (1993). For further
discussion, see Lindseth, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 3.1.
17. See Anthony L. Teasdale, The Life and Death of the Luxembourg
Compromise, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 567 (1993).
18. ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE 4
(1992) [hereinafter EUROPEAN RESCUE].
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technocracy in the European Commission in Brussels. Even after the
mid-1980s, when the Member States abandoned the national veto in
single-market legislation in the Council of Ministers (in favor of a
system of qualified majority voting), they also introduced "several
other legal mechanisms and principles designed functionally-if not
formally-to preserve indirect national hierarchical control over
otherwise autonomous rule-making in the Community system,"
most notably, the system of nationally-dominated oversight
committees ("comitology"), the subsidiarity principle, the pillar
structure, and "flexibility" provisions. 19
This persistence of intergovernmental control (even if by
indirect means) suggests that, at least as a political matter, regulatory
norm-production at the supranational level continued to depend
primarily on the plebiscitarian leadership of national executives as
constitutional representatives of their national political communities.
Indeed, the recently-drafted constitutional treaty may do little to alter
this dependence. The proposal to shift from a rotating to a
permanent presidency of the European Council, for example,
suggests that even the members of the Convention recognize that any
form of plebiscitarian leadership at the supranational level must in
some way be linked to national-executive control via the European
Council. Ardent European federalists understandably fear that such a
move will threaten the political position of the President of the
European Commission as the (hoped-for) future head of a federal
cabinet at the supranational level, akin to a "head of government"
responsible before the European Parliament. Rather, for federalists
the danger is that the President of the Commission might simply
become a sort of "technocrat-in-chief' of an essentially
administrative body subject to a political authority that remains
primarily in the hands of the democratically-elected executives at the
national level, assembled in the European Council. This feature of
the proposed constitutional treaty may thus simply help to
perpetuate, on the political side of the ledger, the character of
European integration as an extension of administrative governance as
it has developed on the national level over the past half-century.
20
19. Delegation is Dead, supra note 13, at 155.
20. It should be noted, however, that for several smaller Member States,
along with the candidate countries in eastern Europe, the shift to a permanent
President of the European Council may itself be a step too far, but not for the
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As noted previously, however, European integration has also
required an important element of supranational adjudicative power.
With the ECJ as well, however, one could argue that it built on
models drawn from the emergence of administrative governance on
the national level in the postwar decades. In the earliest years of
European integration it was common for supporters of the
Community to analogize the European Court of Justice to the Conseil
d'Etat, the summit of the French system of administrative justice.
The strategy behind the analogy was clear: the Conseil d'Etat was a
much-admired institution which, despite its Old Regime and
Napoleonic origins, had proven to be an effective enforcer of the rule
of law in the exercise of administrative power.2 1 Given the largely
technocratic character of the new ECSC as envisioned by Monnet
and his team in 1950, it was only natural that a similar institution
would be established at the Community level to enforce lggalitg
against administrative power in its new supranational guise. The
French socialist Andr6 Philip, in a pamphlet supporting the Schuman
reasons advanced by federalists. Because this proposal prevents each Member
State from serving as the president of the Council on a rotating basis, as the
current system provides, it will dilute the intergovernmental character of the
European Council and thus potentially expose the smaller states to the
domination of the larger Member States. See George Parker, Smaller EU
Countries Dig Their Heels In, FiNANCIAL TIMEs, Sept. 21, 2003, at
www.ft.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). To the same effect is their opposition to the proposed reform of
the Commission, which would institute a rotating system of fifteen fully-
fledged commissioners and ten "subcommissioners." The smaller states and
candidate countries demand that the present system of one seat per country be
maintained (in effect, acknowledging the Commission as a forum for the
representation of national interests on the basis of sovereign parity, rather than
as an autonomous supranational body). Other states are also dissatisfied with
the distribution of seats in the European Parliament (viewing it as too favorable
to larger countries like Germany), as well as the weighting of votes for
purposes of qualified-majority voting, and the list of domains subject to QMV.
See Martin Plichta, Rgunion de d4fiance 6 Prague contre le projet de
Constitution, LE MONDE, Sept. 3, 2003, at www.lemondefr (last visited Oct. 2,
2003) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
21. See, e.g., PIERRE SANDEVOIR, ETUDES SUR LE RECOURS DE PLEINE
JURIDICTION 11 (1964) ("Political liberalism has produced two chefs-d'oeuvre,
both of which result not from the a priori elaboration of an intellectual
construction, but from the natural and fortunate culmination of a particular
historical evolution: parliamentarism in Great Britain and administrative
justice in France").
Fall 20031
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Plan published by the European Movement in 1951, expressed the
typical view. Philip urged confidence in the proposed Court of
Justice precisely because it had been explicitly "modeled on the
French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), an administrative
institution which has in fact ensured the protection of private
interests and individual liberties for more than a century.,
22
The establishment of the European Court of Justice, however,
did not merely build upon, but also seriously disrupted the
institutional patterns of administrative governance on the national
level. By seeking to reproduce the judicial dimension of the postwar
settlement on the supranational level, the Member States
inadvertently introduced a basic contradiction into the process of
European integration. The ECJ became the principal agent in the
transformation of what the drafters of the treaty had arguably
intended only as a system of "instrumental supranationalism"-that
is, a system entailing only so much supranational normative power as
was necessary to achieve the market-integration goals defined by the
treaty-into one of "constitutional supranationalism."
This process began relatively modestly, grounded in two
interrelated ideas: first, that the citizens of the several Member States
enjoyed a new patrimony of rights by virtue of the treaties and
Community secondary legislation; and second, that it was among the
Court's most important duties to protect these rights against national
encroachments. In this way, rather than openly characterizing its
role as the defender of a new and superior sovereignty over that of
the Member States, the Court could strategically depict itself, like
any other court, as the defender of the sovereignty of the individual
against that of the state.23 By the late 1970s and early 1980s,
22. ANDRt PHILIP, THE SCHUMAN PLAN: NUCLEUS OF A EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 38 (1951); see also MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES tTRANGtLRES, LA
COMMUNAUT]t EUROPtENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, RAPPORT DE LA
DtLtGATION FRAN(AISE SUR LE TRAITt ET LA CONVENTION SIGNS A PARIS LE
18 AvRIL 1951 (1951).
23. The ingenuity and force of the Court's constitutionalizing jurisprudence
lay in its linkage of the language of rights-based constitutionalism on the
national level (a powerful discourse after the devastating experience of 1933-
1945) with the Court's instrumental function-indisputable in the treaties-to
act as the enforcer of the Member State's supranational commitments to each
other. The most important example is the Court's willingness to use the
preliminary reference mechanism under Article 177 (now 234) to rule on a
Member State's compliance with its obligations under the treaty rather than the
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however, the Court moved beyond the original rights-based
constitutionalism of the early 1960s to the idea that the Community
implicitly constituted an autonomous level of governance in a
federal-type system-that is, in some sense it had become the
personification or embodiment of the sovereignty of a new political
community-with a legitimacy of its own apart from, and superior
to, the national constitutional orders which had created it.
24
From the perspective of the original drafters of the treaties,
however, the purpose of delegation to supranational institutions like
the Court was not to create an autonomous constitutional level of
governance above the Member States. Rather, it was (as with
delegation to executive and administrative bodies on the national
level) to insulate regulatory decision making from potential future
shifts in domestic parliamentary politics-in short, to prevent the
various Member States from defecting from the general policies of
integration to which they agreed in the treaties. 25 The Member
procedures under the old Articles 169-70 (now 226-27). The key difference
was that private parties in effect had standing to challenge national law under
the old Article 177, whereas under Articles 169-70 only other Member States
and the Commission had standing. See Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The Court here drew
a direct linkage between a rights-based constitutionalist conception of the
Community and the Court's instrumental function to ensure Member State
commitment to the goals of integration: "A restriction of the guarantees against
an infringement of [the treaty] by Member States to the procedures under
Article 169 and 170 would remove all direct legal protection of the individual
rights of their nationals." Id. at 12. More importantly, Article 169 and 170
would be "ineffective," if recourse to them was made "after the
implementation of a national decision taken contrary to the provisions of the
Treaty." Id. The Court concluded: "The vigilance of individuals concerned to
protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the
supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the
Commission and of the Member States." Id.
24. See, e.g., Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v.
Council of the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263 [ERTA]; and Case
804/79, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, 1981
E.C.R. 1045 [Sea Fisheries]. For further discussion, see Lindseth, supra note
1, at 391-402.
25. On the relationship between national and supranational forms of
delegation as commitment mechanisms, see Giandomenico Majone, Europe's
"Democratic Deficit": The Question of Standards 4 EUR. L.J. 5, 17 (1998);
GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, TEMPORAL CONSISTENCY AND POLICY
CREDIBILITY: WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED NON-MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS 1
(Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper No. 96/57, 1996), available at
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States' aim with this instrumental delegation of normative power to
supranational institutions was to address collective-action problems
of coordination and cooperation among disparate political principals,
primarily the executives of the various Member States, but also to a
lesser extent their parliaments. 16 Hence the creation of the necessary
supranational commitment institutions to address these collective-
action problems: the European Commission, and much more
importantly, the European Court of Justice.
In the creation of these commitment institutions, however, the
intergovernmental negotiators of the treaties necessarily recognized
the existence of a political interest-the "Community interest"--
which was independent of, and perhaps superior to, their own
national interests. It was this implicit recognition of an autonomous
Community interest, along with supranational commitment
institutions to defend it, that laid the foundation for the
transformation of the instrumental supranationalism of the drafters of
the treaties into the constitutional supranationalism of the European
Court of Justice.27 As a matter of legal logic, the Court recognized
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/96_57.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
In making his argument about credible commitments, Andrew Moravcsik
draws from REGULATING EUROPE (Giandomenico Majone ed., Routledge
1996); see THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 14, at 74-75 nn.106 & 109.
Andrew Moravcsik has also drawn the linkage between national and
supranational forms of delegation in the context of the emergence of human
rights regimes in postwar Western Europe but his reasoning would apply more
broadly to the modern administrative state. See ANDREW MORAvCSIK,
EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN POSTWAR EUROPE 11
(Weatherhead Ctr. for Int'l Aff., Working Paper No. 98-17, 1998) available at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/466-98-17.pdf [hereinafter EXPLAINING
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES] (last visited Aug. 26, 2003) ("Politicians delegate
power to human rights regimes, like domestic courts and administrative
agencies, to stabilize future political behavior of domestic governments."); see
also id. at 9 ("Institutional commitments, properly designed, insulate the
administration, interpretation, and enforcement of rules from future political
opponents."). In making this argument, Moravcsik relies on Terry Moe,
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
213, 213-53 (1990).
26. See generally WALTER MATLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND (1999).
27. Cf Sea Fisheries, 1981 E.C.R. at 1075, 30 (stating that, in any field
"reserved to the powers of the Community," the Member States, whether
acting alone or via the Council of Ministers, could only "henceforth act only as
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that overcoming collective action problems required not only
supranational institutions with a degree of relative autonomy from
Member State control, but also that the normative output of these
institutions must have some measure of supremacy over national law.
Without some claim to legally enforceable (and nationally
unmediated) supremacy, supranational institutions could not pursue
the Community interest as they understood it; that is, they could not
impose the uniformity necessary to make European economic
integration a functional reality rather than merely a legal fiction.
The Court's constitutionalizing logic was rooted in this
instrumental quest for uniformity, even as it was often bound up with
the rights-based legal discourse so prominent in the decades
following 1945.28 The Court's constitutionalizing logic, however,
could not negate the basic fact at the heart of the process of
integration: Europe's supranational institutions, like administrative
bodies on the national level, drew their "authority not from a
constitutional enactment of some definable European 'demos' ...
but generally from lawful transfers.. . from national [institutions] as
representatives of their national [political] communities. 29
Moreover, even as the Court of Justice openly began to suggest that
Community institutions must, in effect, possess the constitutional
trustees of the common interest").
28. This is made plain in several of the Court's leading
"constitutionalizing" judgments. See, e.g., Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at
12 ("[T]he task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177 .. .is to
secure [a] uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals
... "); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593 ("The executive force
of Community law cannot vary from one State to another... without
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article
5(2)."); Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of
the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 275 [ERTA] (stressing the need
for "the unity of the Common Market and the uniform application of
Community law"); Case 804/79, Commission of the European Communities v.
United Kingdom, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 1074, 23 [Sea Fisheries] (holding that
the textual basis in the treaty for the Commission's claimed approval power
over Member State measures was "fragmentary," but finding that the
Commission power could nevertheless be justified by "the structural principles
on which the Community is founded" as well as "the essential balances
intended by the Treaty").
29. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative
Character of Supranationalism: the Example of the European Community, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 628, 636-37 (1999).
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legitimacy of a supreme level of governance in a federal-type
system,30 the Community remained dependent, as a socio-
legal/socio-institutional matter, on the constitutional foundations of
administrative governance as they had been established in the
postwar decades. This continuing administrative character of
European integration implied that some form of nationally-mediated
legitimation (that is, oversight and control by national constitutional
bodies as representative of their national democratic communities)
continued to be necessary.
3'
This, to my mind, has always been the central contradiction of
European supranationalism. On the one hand, forms of nationally-
mediated legitimation (primarily, but not exclusively, national-
executive oversight and control of supranational norm-production)
were still necessary to advance the integration process politically.
On the other hand, national mediation ran contrary to the
Community's countervailing legal needs for normative autonomy,
uniformity, and supremacy (i.e., the same set of "constitutional"
values of integration that the European Court of Justice took it upon
itself to promote and protect). To appreciate this contradiction fully,
I think it is necessary to look at the process of integration as "one
more stage in the long evolution of the European state," 32 and more
30. See in particular the Court's judgment in Sea Fisheries, 1981 E.C.R.
1045, discussed in Lindseth, supra note 1, at 397-402.
31. The infamous judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in
the Maastricht Decision of 1993 was concrete expression of this ongoing
historical conflict at the heart of European integration, between the demands of
supranational normative autonomy and supremacy, on the one hand, and the
continuing need for nationally mediated legitimation on the other. See Brunner
v. European Union Treaty, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE] [Fed. Const. Court] 89, 155 (F.R.G.) (commonly known as the
Maastricht Decision), English translations at [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, and 33
I.L.M. 388 (1994) [Maastricht Decision]. For further discussion, see Lindseth,
supra note 1, at 1-15; see also PETER L. LINDSETH, THE 'MAASTRICHT
DECISION' TEN YEARS LATER: PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, SEPARATION
OF POWERS, AND THE SCHMITTIAN INTERPRETATION RECONSIDERED,
(Working Paper 2003/. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, Florence, Italy) (forthcoming on-line at
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/).
32. EUROPEAN RESCUE, supra note 18, at x. For other contributions to the
literature, see, for example, HANNs JORGEN KOSTERS, DIE GRUNDUNG DER
EUROPAkISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1982); and SPIERENBURG &
POIDEVIN, supra note 16; and the contributions in DIE ANFANGE DES
SCHUMAN-PLANS, supra note 16 (with contributions in German, English, and
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particularly, as one more stage in the evolution of administrative
governance over the course of the twentieth century. It is to that
historiographical perspective I now turn.
III. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The transfer of regulatory authority to supranational institutions
in Western Europe in the second half of the last century is, I suggest,
the denationalized manifestation of a diffusion and fragmentation of
normative power away from national parliaments, that began to
accelerate at the national level in the 1920s and 1930s and then
reached its full fruition in the postwar decades with the emergence of
the modem welfare state. It was only in the postwar decades that the
identifying characteristic of administrative governance-the decline
of parliaments relative to national executives in national
constitutional orders-was reconciled in any stable way with
historical conceptions of democratic and constitutional legitimacy
inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (which had
placed the parliament at the center of the system).33 The cornerstone
of that reconciliation was a shift in the focus of democratic
legitimation out of the elected assembly to the plebiscitarian
leadership of the chief executive. It was the executive's hierarchical
oversight of the administrative sphere, combined with parliamentary
and judicial controls (supplemented more recently by increased
direct participation in, and transparency of regulatory processes) that
became the principal means of managing technocratic autonomy.
The efficacy of these mechanisms lay in their capacity to balance the
inevitable normative autonomy that came with delegation with forms
of mediated legitimation by national constitutional bodies (executive,
legislative, and judicial), which might then allow the system to be
broadly understood as "democratic" in a historically recognizable
French); IL RELANCIO DELL'EUROPA E I TRATITATI DI ROMA (Enrico Serra ed.,
1989) (with contributions in Italian, German, English, and French); and
BUILDING POsTwAR EUROPE: NATIONAL DECISION-MAKERS AND EUROPEAN
INSTITuTIoNs, 1948-63 (Anne Deighton ed., 1995) [hereinafter BUILDING
POsTwAR EUROPE].
33. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary
Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and
France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. - (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter
Paradox].
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sense. European integration built directly on this reconciliation of
administrative governance and parliamentary democracy. Thus it is
no coincidence that supranationalism emerged as a viable political
project in Western Europe at precisely the moment in history when
the basic constitutional foundations of administrative governance at
the national level were also secured.34
This interpretation, with its emphasis on European integration as
an extension of administrative governance at the national level,
attempts to build on, but also to supplement in important respects,
the prevailing historiography of European integration. To date,
specifically historical interpretations of integration, especially in its
early years, has been dominated by the magisterial works of the
British political-economic historian Alan Milward.35 Milward's
various studies of the origins of integration in postwar Western
Europe have not, as a general matter, explored the relationship
between supranational institutions and the emergence of the
administrative state; nevertheless, Milward does at one point raise
the connection in a brief, but still illuminating, paragraph in the
34. For this reason, those who would later argue that the Community had
somehow "perverted democracy" in an executive and technocratic direction
largely missed the real historical lesson to be drawn from the Community's
institutional development. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a
Constitution? Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J.
219, 233 (1995); see also Daniel Wincott, Does the European Union Pervert
Democracy? Questions ofDemocracy in New Constitutionalist Thought on the
Future of Europe, 4 EUR. L.J. 411 (1998). The process of European
integration was not the cause of the perversion of democracy but rather it was
the beneficiary of a preexisting transformation of national democracies in a
decidedly executive and technocratic direction. See generally Lindseth, supra
note 1, as well as WILLIAM PHELAN, DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION
STRENGTHEN THE STATE? DEMOCRACY, EXECUTIvE POWER, AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 25 (Ctr. for Eur. Stud., Harv. U., Working
Paper No. 95, 2002) [hereinafter PHELAN]; see also Opinion of Advocate-
General Lagrange in Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 604-05 ("Community regulations,
even the most important ones, are not legislative measures nor, even as is
sometimes said, 'quasi-legislative measures,' but rather measures emanating
from an executive power (Council or Commission) which can only act within
the framework of the powers delegated to it by the Treaty and within the
jurisdictional control of the Court of Justice.") (emphasis in original).
35. See generally EUROPEAN RESCUE, supra note 18; see also ALAN S.
MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-51 (1984);
ALAN S. MILWARD ET AL., THE FRONTIER OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY:
HISTORY AND THEORY 1945-1992 (1994).
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introductory chapter of his major work to date on the early years of
integration, The European Rescue of the Nation-State.
36
Milward's purpose in this passage (set out below) is to challenge
the "functionalist" and "neo-functionalist" theories of European
integration which were predominant in the 1950s and early 1960s.
37
According to Milward's characterization, the central claim of these
theories was that European integration was, somehow, the
manifestation of regulatory incapacities of the nation-state which
were thus impelling the transfer of functional competences to
supranational institutions dominated by technocratic rather than
political actors. "Integration [as pursued in the 1950s] was not the
supersession of the nation-state by another form of governance as the
nation-state became incapable," Milward writes.38 Rather, it was:
[T]he creation of the European nation-states themselves for
their own purposes, an act of national will. This is not
surprising, because in the long run of history there has
36. Andrew Moravcsik has also indirectly dealt with this relationship in an
unpublished paper. See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, WHY THE EUROPEAN UNION
STRENGTHENS THE STATE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION (Ctr. for Eur. Stud., Harv. U., Working Paper No. 52, 1994)
available at http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/working__papers/Moravcsik52.pdf
(last visited Aug. 26, 2003). For a critical appraisal of Moravcsik's argument,
advancing an interpretation consistent with the one presented here, see
PHELAN, supra note 34, at 25 ("[E]xecutive autonomy has been an essential
prior ingredient in the formulation of the European Union, rather than a result
of it... ").
37. See EUROPEAN RESCUE, supra note 18. "Functionalists" believed that
policy-making would be increasingly shifted to specific problem-solving
institutions at the international/supranational level, which would be insulated
from politics, harmonizing values and concrete objectives according to
"technical" criteria. See, e.g., DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM:
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (1943); Harrop A. Freeman, International Administrative Law:
A Functional Approach to Peace, 57 YALE L.J. 976 (1948). By the 1950s, the
"functionalist" interpretation was displaced by the so-called "neofunctionalist"
model, which questioned the separation between the "technical" and the
"political." While the neo-fuanctionalists recognized that integration emerged
first from a political process of interaction among pluralist interests, once the
"rules of the game" were established, functionalist incrementalism could take
over through the "spill-over" effect. See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF
EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957 (Stanford
University Press 1968) (1958); see also LEON N. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1963).
38. EUROPEAN RESCUE, supra note 18, at 18.
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surely never been a period when national government in
Europe has exercised more effective power and more
extensive control over its citizens than that since the Second
World War, nor one in which its ambitions expanded so
rapidly. Its laws, officials, policemen, spies, statisticians,
revenue collectors, and social workers have penetrated into
a far wider range of human activities than they were earlier
able or encouraged to do. If the states' executive power is
less arbitrarily exercised than in earlier periods, which some
would also dispute, it is still exercised remorselessly,
frequently, in finer detail and in more directions than it was.
This must be reconciled in theory and in history with the
surrender of national sovereignty.
39
There are, as Milward implies but does not explore, important
linkages to be drawn between the development of the modern
administrative state in postwar Western Europe and the process of
European integration. Both depended on a combination of "fusion"
of normative power in the national executive but also a "diffusion"
of power into a complex and far-reaching administrative sphere. The
core of Milward's argument in The European Rescue of the Nation-
State is that the extension of this phenomenon to the Community
level in the 1950s actually reflected the "will of the European nation-
state to survive as an organizational entity. '40 The same claim can
also be made, however, with regard to the institutional changes
generally associated with the rise of administrative governance on
the national level, particularly the extensive delegation of normative
power to the executive and technocratic sphere after 1945. Both
forms of delegation, national and supranational, were reflective of a
conscious effort by major political actors to reinforce the nation-state
by making it a more effective agent in the promotion of public
welfare, by insulating decision-making from parliamentary
interference and factionalism and thereby pre-committing the state to
a stream of purportedly welfare-enhancing future policy choices.
39. Id. Earlier, Milward wrote of how nineteenth-century government "did
not have the financial resources, nor in many cases a sufficiently powerful
executive, for its policy choices to be more than inconsistent interventions."
Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 223.
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This common political purpose behind national and
supranational delegation, as well as the paradoxical combination of
fusion and diffusion of normative power in an era of administrative
governance, begin to point us toward the reconciliation "in theory
and in history" that Milward seeks. For example, Milward argues
that the postwar nation-state's survival depended "on the prosperity
which sustained the domestic post-war political compromises
everywhere." 41 The key to this prosperity, according to Milward,
was anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany firmly in the
western camp, both economically and politically, through a process
42of integration. One could also fairly argue, however, that
"sustain[ing] the domestic post-war political compromises
everywhere" also required the broader constitutional stabilization of
administrative governance; that is, the legitimation of regulatory
power delegated outside the parliamentary realm, under the auspices
of a plebiscitarian chief executive. It was this constitutional
stabilization that provided the institutional foundation for both the
postwar welfare state as well as the process of European integration,
by making each capable of the sort of credible policy commitments
that its regulatory ambitions required.
43
Although Milward alludes to the process of domestic
constitutional settlement of administrative governance in the postwar
era-not merely to the concentration of governing power in the
executive-technocratic sphere, but also to the counter-balancing
(presumably judicial) checks to ensure that such power would be
"less arbitrarily exercised than in earlier periods""-he does not
subsequently pursue this line of analysis.45 He is, rather, primarily
41. Id. at 18.
42. This would allow West Germany's smaller or less dynamic neighbors-
especially France-to take advantage, in a "neo-mercantilist" fashion, of West
Germany's burgeoning market and economic power. See id. at 134
("Domestic policy was not in the end sustainable unless this neo-mercantilism
could be guaranteed by its Europeanization."). See generally id. ch. 4.
43. See generally Lindseth, supra note 1, Part One.
44. EUROPEAN RESCUE, supra note 18, at 18.
45. There are also several indirect references to the rise of administrative
governance in Milward's second chapter, "The Post-War Nation-State," but
again no effort to examine their import in legal-constitutional terms. Id. at 24.
"By what precise political mechanism did the organizational unit of the
state ... come to play such a role in the vast improvement in human life which
took place [after 1945]?," Milward queries. Id. at 24. (emphasis added). He
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an economic historian, or perhaps more accurately, an historian of
international political economy and public policy. Thus, when
Milward writes that the durability of European integration resulted
from its "rest[ing] so firmly on the economic and social foundations
of post-war political change,"46 his analysis is limited only to
"changes in the political economy of the post-war state," and not to
changes in the legal-institutional mechanisms through which the
resulting public-policy choices were formulated or implemented.47
As Milward's own findings confirm, however, during the
formative period of European integration choices over policy were
intimately bound up with the "politics of bureaucratic structure,"
4 8
that is, negotiations among national executives over the substance of
European integration were always linked to negotiations over
decision-making procedures and the distribution of powers.49
later responds that this was due to "a different form of political organization
based on a new distribution of political power." Id. (emphasis added).
Milward seems to be speaking here, however, of political parties rather than
administrative institutions, although he acknowledges how "national
parliaments became the arena in which [parties] performed stylized rituals
which ratified the policy choices already made from the assessment of
information gathered deep in the roots of local society and government where
they now began to function." Id. at 27-28. Milward never examines whether
policy choices, rather than being ratified in parliaments, were actually
delegated to the executive and administrative spheres. In a more direct
reference to the administrative apparatus, Milward later refers to the role of
social insurance between 1945-1968 as "creat[ing] a robust national
framework of personal claims on the state's finances, mediated through a
rapidly expanding welfare bureaucracy." Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. See also Milward's discussion of the "bundle of policies" which all
Western European states selected in the postwar era, including increases in
social welfare, agricultural protection, employment policies, industrialization
policies. See Alan S. Milward & Vibeke Sorensen, Interdependence or
Integration? A National Choice, in MILWARD ET AL., THE FRONTIER OF
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY AND THEORY, 1945-1992, at 5-6 (1993).
He makes no mention of the broader constitutional policy choice in favor of
executive power through legislative delegation. Id. Also, when Milward does
reach the question of specific institutional arrangements in The European
Rescue of the Nation-State, he spends only two pages discussing them. See
EUROPEAN REscuE, supra note 18, at 217-18.
48. The phrase is taken from Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1989).
49. For further elaboration, see the material discussed in Lindseth, supra
note 1, ch. 3, § 3.2.
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Indeed, if one turns to the work of the American political scientist
Andrew Moravcsik (whose historical analysis of European
integration is broadly sympathetic to that of Milward), this point is
made even more explicitly. According to Moravcsik, agreements
over decision-making procedures at the supranational level can be
understood in game-theoretical terms as the means by which the
participating states signaled the credibility of their policy
commitments in the specified domains of integration.5 0  Like
Milward, however, Moravcsik also fails to consider directly the
extent to which a state's credibility was also a function of the
constitutional stabilization and legitimacy of national administrative
governance on which these various supranational structures and
procedures were modeled.5'
Milward and Moravcsik are representative of what is known
generally as the "intergovernmentalist" or "state-centric"
understanding of the process of European integration. 52 State-centric
in this context means that the nation-state, and more particularly
national executive politicians, should be understood as the key
independent variables that have historically driven the process of
European integration. However, neither Milward nor Moravcsik
crudely argue that integration was exclusively a "top down"
phenomenon; rather, both suggest that there was a complex "social
politics," or rather, a complex "political economy" underlying
particular national approaches to integration. 3 At the heart of that
50. THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 14, at 9 (arguing that Member
State decisions to delegate to the supranational level in the European
Community "are best explained as efforts by governments to constrain and
control one another-in game-theoretical language, by their effort to enhance
the credibility of commitments"). See also the sources cited supra note 25.
51. Moravcsik's work on postwar human rights regimes in Western Europe
is, however, suggestive of this linkage. See MORAVCSIK, EXPLAINING HUMAN
RIGHTS REGIMES, supra note 25, at 14-18.
52. For an overview of the contending theories of integration, see, for
example, Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Contending Models of Governance
in the European Union, in EUROPE'S AMBIGUOUS UNITY: CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS IN THE POST-MAASTRICHT ERA 21 (Alan W. Cafruny & Carl
Lankowski eds., 1997). For an older but still very useful overview, see
CAROLE WEBB, Introduction to MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1
(Helen Wallace et al. eds., 1977).
53. In order to understand the integration process fully, both Milward and
Moravcsik conclude that a truly "social history" of integration is necessary. As
Moravcsik describes it, this approach would require detailed attention to the
Fall 2003]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:363
politics was a struggle among the defenders of various powerful
interest groups at the national level (e.g., agricultural producers in
France, or industrial producers in Germany) over the allocation of
the potential benefits of increased intra-European trade.54
This acknowledgment by both Milward and Moravcsik of the
importance of interest-group politics in driving the process of
integration, however, clearly runs contrary to their general emphasis
on national-executive political control over the process of
integration; indped, it perhaps constitutes an implied admission that
integration cannot be understood entirely in intergovemmentalist
terms. When one turns to the subsequent development of European
integration from the 1960s to the 1980s, one finds that interest-group
pressures, most importantly exerted through preliminary references
to the European Court of Justice under the old Article 177 (now 234)
of the EC Treaty, also became a significant factor in driving the
integration process. 55 For this reason many observers have found
that a predominantly intergovemmentalist explanation does not
provide a fully satisfactory framework within which to analyze the
array of domestic interests on each side of the integration question (and
implicitly how and why they formed), as well as "how conflicts among them
are resolved, by what means they are translated into policy, and when they
require political integration." THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 14, at 16;
See also Alan S. Milward, The Frontier of National Sovereignty 197-98 (1998)
and Peter Ludlow, Recasting the European Political System, 1950-1996, 1
CEPS REV. 25-33 (Summer 1996).
54. The major exception on the primacy of economic factors was West
Germany. On the relative primacy of geopolitical considerations in West
Germany (i.e., Adenauer's desire to restore West Germany's status as a power
in the western camp), see Sabine Lee, German Decision-Making Elites and
European Integration: German 'Europolitik" During the Years of the EEC and
Free Trade Area Negotiations, in BUILDING POsTwAR EUROPE, supra note 32,
at 38.
55. An analysis of Article 177 references in the three decades after 1961,
published by Alec Stone Sweet and James Caporaso, found a positive and
significant statistical relationship between references and subsequent
Community legislation, thus suggesting that increased interest group pressure,
manifested through litigation, had an impact on pushing the Community's
secondary legislative process forward. Alec Stone Sweet & James A.
Caporaso, La Cour de Justice et l'int~gration europ~enne, 48 REVUE
FRAN(AISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 195 (1998). The study also found,
importantly, that there was a nearly linear relationship between increases in
intra-Conamunity trade and Article 177 references, suggesting a direct linkage
between the two.
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integration phenomenon. When one focuses on the body of case law
handed down by the European Court of Justice over the last forty
years, as well as its arguable impact on the Community legislative
process, it becomes clear that the direction of Community
development cannot be entirely explained by political decisions
made at the level of national governments.
In a series of articles over the course of the 1990s, Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Walter Mattli have sought to explain the role of the
Court in terms of neofunctionalism, a theory of integration which
had fallen out of favor since the middle 1960s for seemingly sound
empirical reasons.56 The Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, which
perpetuated unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers despite
treaty provisions to the contrary, along with other developments of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, 5 all seemed to contradict the basic
56. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993) [hereinafter
Europe Before the Court] (Anne-Marie Burley is now Anne-Marie Slaughter);
Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European
Union, 49 INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration: Accounting
for Judicial Preferences and Constraints, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND
NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS
SOCIAL CONTExT 253 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Role of National Courts]; Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting
the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177 (1998).
57. These developments included the establishment of the "Committee of
Permanent Representatives of the Member States" (COREPER), the Council's
own permanent bureaucracy in Brussels, which has operated in parallel with
the European Commission. As the intergovernmental nature of much of the
Community's legislative decision-making became more clear over the course
of the 1960s, the COREPER took on a concomitantly greater role in
Community norm-production. See Lindseth, supra note 1, at 302-03. In
Article 4 of the Merger Treaty of 1965, which created a single Council and
single Commission for all three European Communities, the COREPER
system was explicitly formalized in treaty law. TREATY ESTABLISHING A
SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, April 8, 1965, art. 4 1967 J.O.(152)1, 4 I.L.M. 776 [hereinafter
MERGER TREATY]. The Merger Treaty also effected another change in
Community law of a perhaps more symbolic nature, but one no less interesting
for our purposes. In replacing the High Authority of the ECSC with a single
Commission for the three European Communities, the Merger Treaty also
deleted the old Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris, which spoke of the
"supranational" character of the members of the High Authority of the ECSC.
The new provision-Article 10 of the Merger Treaty-also specified that the
members of the unified Commission would, "in the general interest of the
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prediction of the original neofunctionalists. These theorists had
believed that the driving force behind integration would be an
alliance of Community technocrats and national interest groups, over
the heads of national executives, forcing the incremental expansion
of the Community's regulatory domain (the "spill-over" effect), all
of which would be beyond intergovernmental control. In the years
following the Luxembourg Compromise, the predominantly
intergovernmental character of the Community legislative process (at
least as a political matter) seemed irrefutable-tempered only
slightly by the existence of a sphere of autonomous instrumental
supranationalism (for example, in the competition law context) that
was, in any event, greatly diminished by the Luxembourg
Compromise. In the face of the seemingly overwhelming contrary
evidence, therefore, the leading neofunctionalist theorists of the
1950s and 1960s felt compelled to recognize the apparently weak
predictive quality of their theory.58
However, in an initial joint article in 1993, Slaughter and Mattli
argued persuasively that this capitulation was far too premature,
focusing too narrowly on the supranational legislative process and
paying insufficient attention to the process of supranational
adjudication, the significance of which was only beginning to emerge
in the middle 1960s. Slaughter and Mattli pointed out that "[b]y
1965" (ironically, the year of the "empty chair" crisis which would
culminate in the Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966):
Communities, be completely independent in the performance of their duties."
MERGER TREATY art. 10. However, in contrast with Article 9 of the Treaty of
Paris, Article 10 of the Merger Treaty tracked the language of Article 157 of
the Treaty of Rome, dropping the word "supranational" in its description of
these duties, stating only that the members of the Commission should "refrain
from any action incompatible with their duties," and that "[e]ach Member State
undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of
the Commission in the performance of their tasks." MERGER TREATY art. 10.
Thus, what had been the sole mention of the "supranational" character of
European integration (in Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris) was now removed
from the positive treaty law of European integration entirely.
Finally, the key development from the early 1970s was the
establishment of the European Council, specifically outside the treaty
framework, in 1974. For further discussion, see generally Lindseth, supra note
1, ch. 3, § 3.3.
58. See, e.g., Ernst B. Haas, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections
on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORY
AND RESEARCH 3 (Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1971).
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[A] citizen of a community country could ask a national
court to invalidate any provision of domestic law found to
conflict with certain directly applicable provisions of the
treaty. By 1975, a citizen of an EC country could seek the
invalidation of a national law found to conflict with the
self-executing provisions of community secondary
legislation, the "directives" to national governments passed
by the EC Council of Ministers.59
These doctrinal innovations by the Court of Justice, Slaughter
and Mattli attempted to show, laid the foundation for a dynamic of
integration that corresponded remarkably well to the particulars of
the neofunctionalist theory, with two major differences: first, it was
the law that "function[ed] as a mask for politics, precisely the role
neofunctionlists originally forecast for economics"; 60 and second, it
was the Court of Justice that took the lead in forging an effective
supranational alliance with national interest groups (private litigants,
their lawyers, and lower national courts) to push the boundaries of
integration-the role the neofunctionalists originally envisioned for
the Commission.
More recently, Slaughter and Mattli have supplemented their
theory by combining it with the model of the so-called
"disaggregated state" in order to better understand the motives of the
private interests and various institutional actors (subnational, national
and supranational) with whom the Court has historically interacted.6'
The purpose of this shift was to "move beyond the assumption of the
unitary state" (ironically, an assumption that the ECJ has itself made
for strategic reasons62) to a more sophisticated appreciation of the
state as an assemblage of "different governmental institutions
interacting with one another" as well as with private individuals and
interest groups. 63  "Each of these institutions," they noted, "has
59. Europe Before the Court, supra note 56, at 42; for an analysis of the
major doctrinal developments of the 1960s and 1970s, see Lindseth, supra note
1, at ch. 4, §4.2.
60. Europe Before the Court, supra note 56, at 44.
61. Role of National Courts, supra note 56, at 255.
62. See, e.g., Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (1974) (treating the Member State as a unity-that is, a
kind of "black box"--imposing supranational obligations on all its
constitutional branches to the same degree and in the same manner).
63. Role of National Courts, supra note 56, at 255.
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specific interests shaped by the structure of a particular political
system, the need to perform specific socio-political functions such as
judging or legislating, and the demands of specific political
constituencies. ' 64
What Slaughter and Mattli appear to be confronting in their new
model of the "disaggregated state" seems, in fact, strikingly similar
to the phenomenon at the core of administrative governance: the
diffusion and fragmentation of normative power within and beyond
the modem nation-state, and the differential functions of national
constitutional bodies-legislatures, executives, and courts-in
mediating the legitimacy of this evolving form of administrative
governance.65 When combined with an historical appreciation of the
various elements of the postwar constitutional settlement, the
analytical strategy proposed by Slaughter and Mattli can help us to
better understand why the integration dynamic predicted by the
neofunctionalists in the 1950s and early 1960s failed to take hold in
the economic-technocratic domain (consistent with
intergovemmentalist theory) but succeeded in the legal-judicial
domain, as Mattli and Slaughter have fairly characterized in
neofunctionalist terms.
The key phenomenon at the heart of the theory advanced by
Slaughter and Mattli is also something that they admittedly cannot
explain: political deference to courts. In their 1993 article, they
suggested competing hypotheses-on the one hand, that "judicial
deference is a bedrock norm of Western liberal democracies;" and on
the other, that it was the consequence of political calculations of
rational self-interest (for example, "the oppositional use of a third-
party tribunal to check the power of the majority party").67 For the
legal historian, however, these hypotheses hardly seem
contradictory: How an idea becomes a governing norm, and how that
norm is translated into legal and institutional reality, are always the
consequence of the aggregation of experience over time as to what
64. Id.
65. This appreciation of diffusion and fragmentation is arguably even
greater in so-called "institutionalist" analyses of European integration. See,
e.g., KENNETH A. ARMSTRONG & SIMON J. BULMER, THE GOVERNANCE OF
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1998).
66. See Europe Before the Court, supra note 56, at 75.
67. Id.
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constitutes a stable and just governing system (which can of course
include the instrumental recognition of the necessity of judicial
independence).68 The phenomenon of political deference to courts is
ultimately a historical question, calling for an examination of the
historical relationship of law to power, or, as it has sometimes been
called (particularly in the French tradition), of "justice" to
"administration." 69
The distinction between justice and administration has deep
roots in the history of modem state formation, and a complete
examination of that topic would take us far beyond the scope of this
essay.70 What I propose to do here is simply to suggest a new
historical synthesis to account for how the justice-administration
distinction manifested itself in Western Europe in the postwar
decades and why it resulted in greater normative autonomy for courts
(including the ECJ) relative to administrative officials.
In the postwar Western European state, the administrative
sphere did indeed come to enjoy a degree of normative autonomy
through legislative delegation, although that autonomy resulted not
generally from legal right but rather from organizational complexity
and the difficulties of hierarchical political control. In contrast with
the United States, where the constitutionality of independent
regulatory agencies had been firmly established in the 1930s,
71
administrative bodies in postwar Western Europe always remained,
in formal-legal terms at least, under the hierarchical authority of the
national executive.72 National executive politicians were of course
68. Compare MoRAvCsIK, EXPLAINING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES, supra
note 25, for a concrete example.
69. See, e.g., Marguerite Boulet-Sautel, Police et administration en France
,i la fin de l'Ancien Rggime, in HISTOIRE COMPARtE DE L'ADMINISTRATION
(IVE-XVIIIE SItCLES): ACTES DU 14E COLLOQUE HISTORIQUE FRANCO-
ALLEMAND (Werner Paravicini & Karl Ferdinand Werner eds., 1980); see also
KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, Science and Politics at the End of the Old Regime
and Representation Redefined, in INVENTING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION:
ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY(1990); and for more recent developments, JACQUES CHEVALLIER,
L'ELABORATION HISTORIQUE DU PRINCIPE DE StPARATION DE LA JURIDICTION
ADMINISTRATIVE ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION ACTIVE (1970).
70. See sources cited supra note 69. See also discussion of the British case,
Lindseth, supra note 1, at 117-21.
71. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
72. Emblematic of the prevailing reliance on hierarchical control by the
executive was the statement of Lord Greene, the Master of the Rolls in the
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willing to exploit the seeming "neutrality" of technocratic expertise
as a means of rationalizing legislative delegation in the sphere of
economic policy, but this did not translate into a willingness to grant
formal-legal autonomy to technocratic decision-makers without
concomitant executive oversight and control over the final policy
outcomes. In the postwar decades, the perception of "depoliticized"
technocratic expertise thus supported not the normative autonomy of
administrative officials but rather the further concentration of power
in the hands of national executive politicians.73 Reinforcing this
phenomenon was the shift in the main locus of democratic legitimacy
to the chief executive as plebiscitarian leader, who remained
politically responsible in the broadest sense for the normative output
of the administrative sphere.74
By contrast, in the judicial sphere, the very purpose of courts
and court-like juridictions administratives in the postwar
constitutional settlement was to serve as an independent check on the
exercise of executive and administrative power in the interest of
legislatively and constitutionally defined policy goals. Judicial
independence was in part rationalized in terms of classical notions of
"justice"--that is, in the resolution of particular controversies
between private parties and the possessors of public power-now
overlaid with an increasing emphasis on rights. Judicial
independence also served, however, the functional purpose within
the administrative state of checking precisely the normative
autonomy that derived from organizational complexity beyond the
hierarchical control of the executive and parliament.
75
Court of Appeal, in 1947: "[T]he ultimate arbiter is the Minister himself."
Taylor v. Brighton Borough Council, 1947 K.B. 736, 748-49.
73. Particularly in the French Fifth Republic, the notion of technocratic
"depoliticization" provided a kind of ideological cover for the new regime.
See, for example, the speech of Michel Debr6 as newly installed prime
minister in January 1959, presenting the first government of the Fifth Republic
to the National Assembly, in which he said the "major imperative" of the new
constitution was to "depoliticize" policymaking (quoted in La d~politisation:
mythe ou r~alit ?, 120 CAHIERS DE LA FONDATION NATIONALE DES SCIENCES
POLITIQUES 51 (Georges Vedel ed., 1962)).
74. See the concluding sections to Paradox, supra note 33.
75. This demand for judicial independence is aptly demonstrated by the
reforms that ensued in Britain following the so-called Crichel Down affair.
For a contemporaneous overview, see J.A.G. Griffith, The Crichel Down
Affair, 18 MODERN L. REV. 557 (1955); see also SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN,
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Administrative and constitutional litigation were means by which the
constituent and legislative power at the national level could enlist
private interests (via the judiciary) in the task of controlling this sort
of normative autonomy-a kind of "non-hierarchical" commitment
mechanism.
When these aspects of the postwar constitutional settlement
were transferred to the supranational level in the 1950s, however, the
result was contradictory trends-the infamous "dual character of
supranationalism" which Joseph Weiler attempted to describe at the
outset of the 1980s. 76 As for technocratic autonomy, in the earliest
years of integration national executives demonstrated a willingness
to accept, instrumentally, the Commission's power of legislative
initiative but little else, save grants of relatively autonomous
authority in certain limited domains like competition policy. 77 Thus,
LAW AND ORDERS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF DELEGATED
LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE POWERS IN ENGLISH LAW 343-53 (2d ed. 1956)
(1945). The affair exposed problems relating to administrative secrecy,
organizational complexity, the lack of clear lines of authority, and
opportunities for unfairness which these factors created. To quell the public
outcry that flowed from the affair, the British government established a
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (the "Franks
Committee") in November 1955 to examine the question of administrative
justice, which led directly to the passage of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act of
1958, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 66 (1958) (Eng.). The act established a "Council on
Tribunals" with broad consultative and review functions over the procedures
and the formation of tribunals in the administrative sphere. The work of the
Council over the subsequent decade established "a much clearer standard" of
what was minimally necessarily consistent with administrative fairness.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOvERNMENT:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 153 (1972).
Importantly, the act itself provided for extended rights of appeal to judicial
courts (reflective of the fundamentally subordinate character of these tribunals
on questions of law), as well as a requirement that tribunals publicly provide
reasons for their decisions (essential to effective judicial review).
76. Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of
Supranationalism, Y.B. EUR. L., 1982, at 267.
77. From the inception of the European Community, competition policy
was often cited as the domain most amenable to supranational control. See,
e.g., COMITE INTERGOUVERNEMENTAL CREE PAR LA CONFtRENCE DE
MESSINE, RAPPORT DES CHEFS DE DItLtGATION AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES
tTRANGtRES 24 (Brussels, Apr. 21, 1956) [Spaak Report] (asserting that
certain regulatory domains specifically required a measure of supranational
autonomy from intergovernmental control, the least problematic example being
"the application and control of competition rules" which, after all, would be
"in the interest of the producers themselves," who would benefit from the
Fall 2003]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:363
from the establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1951 to the
creation of the European Council in 1974 (interestingly, originally
outside the treaty framework), national executive politicians sought
to impose, consistent with the postwar constitutional settlement, their
formal-legal hierarchical authority over technocratic norm-
production in its new supranational guise.
This sort of hierarchical legitimation, mediated through national
political institutions, proved much more difficult to maintain in the
judicial context, precisely because the same insistence on national-
executive control ran directly contrary to the judicial role in the
postwar constitutional settlement. An anecdote from the first decade
of the EEC's existence demonstrates the point: In 1966, the German
federal government ordered German customs officials to disregard a
decision of the European Court of Justice because it conflicted "with
well-reasoned arguments of the federal government." 78 This attempt
to assert the normative supremacy of the national executive over the
Court provoked a campaign by German legal scholars and the
Association of German Exporters against the government's order,
culminating in official questions to the government in parliament as
to how to reconcile the order with the principles of the Rechtsstaat.
79
The linkage drawn in German domestic politics between the ECJ and
the Rechtsstaat suggests how the Court's normative authority derived
from the perception that it was "simply a continuation of the
traditional role of European courts and, indeed, liberal courts
everywhere: the protection of individual rights against the state.",
80
The Court of Justice can be viewed, then, as an attempt to
transfer the judicial component of the postwar constitutional
settlement of administrative governance to the supranational level-
with one overarching deviation. On the national level, a principal
function of judicial review in the postwar constitutional settlement
was to constrain the normative autonomy of administrative actors
through the enforcement of substantive and procedural requirements
rapidity and legal certainty of a common supranational mechanism.").
78. July 7, 1966 (IIIB.4-V 8534-1/66), Der Betrieb (1966), 1160, quoted in
Karen J. Alter, The European Court's Political Power, 19 W. EUR. POL. 458,
475 (1996).
79. Gert Meier, Der Streit um die Unsatzausgleichsteuer aus
integrationspolitischer Sicht, 3 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFT
75-77 (1994), cited in Alter, supra note 78, at 476 n.57.
80. Europe Before the Court, supra note 56, at 64.
EU CONTRADICTIONS
derived from legislation and the constitution. Thus, at the national
level, courts and court-like juridictions administratives in the French
tradition served as mechanisms to mediate legitimacy of
administrative institutions that, on the one hand, possessed extensive
rulemaking and adjudicative powers but, on the other, had no
corresponding democratic and constitutional legitimacy of their own.
By contrast with their national counterparts, however, the
European Court of Justice did not view its principal function as one
of constraining the normative autonomy of Community institutions,
despite their fundamentally administrative character (in the sense of
lacking autonomous democratic and constitutional legitimacy).
Although the Court took seriously its role as the enforcer of
supranational legality under the treaty, it took even more seriously its
commitment function, particularly under the Court's own expansive
interpretation of the old Article 177 of the EC Treaty."' Thus, rather
than acting to constrain the normative autonomy of Community
institutions (most importantly its own), the Court actively sought to
promote that autonomy in the interest of developing a more effective
mechanism for policing Member State commitment to the goals of
integration.
A judge on the Court of Justice would later characterize this
expansive interpretation of the commitment function as the
"preference for Europe... determined by the genetic code
transmitted to the Court by the founding fathers."8 2 This purported
"preference for Europe," however, brought the Court into direct
conflict with legislative and constitutional interests on the national
level. Despite the claim that national institutions could clearly make
to being the locus of democratic and constitutional legitimacy in the
Community system, and despite the evidence that the original
Member States never foresaw the expansive role that the Court
would claim for itself,83 the Court regarded the idea of supranational
81. The leading case in this regard is of course Van Gend & Loos, 1963
E.C.R. at 11-13 (holding the power conferred under Article 177 to rule on
preliminary references on "the interpretation of this Treaty" included the
power to review the conformity of Member State law with a treaty
requirement, something akin to supranational "constitutional review"). For
further analysis, see Lindseth, supra note 1, at 346-54.
82. G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the
European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REv. 175, 186 (1994).
83. See the position of the Netherlands, supported by Belgium and West
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legitimacy mediated in any way through national institutions-with
good reason, perhaps-as fundamentally incompatible with the
instrumental needs of uniformity and effectiveness of Community
law throughout the Member States. As a practical matter, therefore,
the Court was perhaps the first to recognize that the demands of
"instrumental supranationalism," as established by the treaties, were
inherently in conflict with national constitutional orders. The extent
of the conflict was certainly more than the political negotiators of the
various Community treaties ever envisioned.
IV. THE 1980s AND AFTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
SUPRANATIONALISM TRuMPHANT?
The irony in the Court's constitutionalizing jurisprudence of the
1960s and after was that in many respects it was, as noted above, a
logical extension of the instrumental commitment function that
Member States asked the Court to undertake in the treaty. As Alan
Milward has argued, in the drafting of the Treaty of Rome the
intergovernmental negotiators recognized that the Community
needed "a central system of law" to make European integration a
functioning reality.84  Indeed, despite his attachment to
intergovemmentalism as an explanation of integration, Milward has
gone so far as to call this central legal system "a constitution, in the
form of treaties that call into being a new distinctive legal order to
regulate the powers, rights and obligations residing in the
integrationist framework and their relationship with the member
states."
85
Here, however, Milward is using the term "constitution" in
precisely the formal sense noted at the outset of this essay, rather
than in the normative sense of establishing a new political
community over and above the Member States. Milward continues
to view this "integrationist framework" in primarily inter-
Germany, in Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 11, as well as that of Italy in
Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585. See also Lindseth, supra note 1, at 365 ("Given the
fact that four of the six Member States had, in Van Gend & Loos and now in
Costa, explicitly objected to the Court's interpretation of the scope of its
authority under Article 177(a), it is highly doubtful that the Member States had
'accepted' anything approaching the sort of supranational constitutional system
described by the Court, except perhaps in the most abstract sense.").
84. Milward & Sorensen, supra note 47, at 19.
85. Id.
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govemmentalist terms, which leads him to make an assertion that
runs directly contrary to the jurisprudence of the Court since the
early 1960s. An extended quotation is worthwhile:
Assuming, as we have done, that nation-states, in order to
advance important domestic policy objectives, choose to
transfer sovereignty over certain policy areas to common
institutions, then their principal national interest will be not
only to define and limit that transfer of sovereignty very
carefully but also meticulously to structure the central
institutions so as to preserve a balance of power within the
integrationist framework in favour of the nation-states
themselves.
... The Treaties of Paris and Rome [thus] state the
powers of the institutions as well as the precise relationship
between them. Important in this respect was the allotment
of the task of policy-making to the Council of Ministers
composed of members of national governments, which
ensures that control over the future development of the
Community remains with the member states. That such
control was considered crucial can be seen from the
reluctance to include a more detailed goal for the
Community than the rather vague commitment to the 'ever
closer union'. It can be seen too in the elimination of the
word 'supranational' from provisional drafts of the Treaties
of Rome.... The [member] states themselves, provided
there is some concord in policy goals between them, can, as
historical events have shown, create an effective,
enforceable international law which remains securely under
their joint control.86
Alan Milward failed to foresee, however, that it was precisely
the instrumentalist provision for a "central system of law" which led
the Court to view the Community as a novel kind of constitutional
polity with an autonomous governing legitimacy of its own, one
approaching-in fact superseding-that of the (implicitly
subordinate) institutions of the Member States. For the national
executives of the Member States, the Court's judicial "commitment
function" was always a two-edged sword, at times reinforcing but at
86. Id.
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other times undermining their "joint control." When the Court found
that the Member State executives, via the Council, were acting
consistently with the Court's teleological-constitutional
understanding of the Community, the Court supported their efforts.
8 7
On the other hand, when the Court found that national executives
were interpreting the treaty in an excessively intergovernmental
fashion at the expense of the "Community interest" as the Court
understood it, the Court cast a deeply skeptical eye."8 More
importantly, in its expansive interpretation of its powers under the
old Article 177, the Court demonstrated a willingness to deviate from
precisely the "meticulous structure" of limited, instrumental
supranationalism that Milward argues the Member States sought to
create.
89
In short, in its supranational adjudicative capacity the Court
worked hard-based on "the rather vague commitment to the 'ever
closer union'," as Milward calls it-to counteract intergovernmental
control and oversight in favor of a "constitutional supranationalism"
that the Court itself discerned from the treaty. It is for this reason
that Anne-Marie Slaughter and Walter Mattli have argued, at least in
so far as the Court is concerned, that the process of integration is
much better understood in neofunctionalist rather than
intergovernmental terms.90
87. The best example would be the Council of Ministers' expansive use of
Article 235 legislation in the 1970s. For a summary, see John A. Usher, The
Gradual Widening of European Community Policy on the Basis of Article 100
and 235 of the EEC Treaty, in STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNrTY POLICY 30 (Jiirgen Schwarze & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1988);
see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2444-47 (1991); and Lindseth, supra note 1, at 311-13.
88. Perhaps the major exception was the Court's treatment of the so-called
"comitology system." In a 1970 decision, the ECJ rejected a challenge to the
comitology system which asserted that it not only interfered with the
Commission's independent right of decision, but also that it was unforeseen by
the treaty and therefore distorted the institutional relationship between the
Commission and the Council. See Case 25/70, Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fiir
Getreide und Futtermittel v. K6ster, Berodt, & Co., 1970 E.C.R. 1161. The
Court found that a delegation of powers from the Council to the Commission
under the treaty was entirely voluntary, and thus it was within the power of the
Council to decide on the mechanisms whereby that delegated power would be
exercised.
89. See sources cited supra note 23 and accompanying text.
90. See sources cited supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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The issue for the 1980s and 1990s would be whether the
Member States would succumb to the logic of constitutional
supranationalism as defined by the Court since the 1960s. In one
interpretation of events, the answer has been "yes": Constitutional
supranationalism has been, seemingly, triumphant, at least since the
political breakdown in the "veto culture" engendered by the
Luxembourg Compromise of 1966.9' After 1982, the unraveling of
political support for the Luxembourg Compromise began to
accelerate, culminating in the Member States' adoption of the Single
European Act (SEA) in 1986.92 The SEA vastly expanded qualified-
majority voting in the Council of Ministers, most importantly in the
politically delicate domain of the harmonization of technical non-
tariff barriers to trade in completion of the internal market. The
SEA, moreover, also broadened the legislative role of the European
Parliament, which gained a suspensive veto in certain domains under
the so-called "cooperation procedure" (later expanded under the
Treaty on European Union of 1992 to include a genuine veto under
the "co-decision procedure").
These procedural changes were all bound up with the ambitious
legislative program outlined in the Commission's 1985 White Paper
Completing the Internal Market,93 with the purpose of achieving a
genuinely single market, shorn of all non-tariff barriers to trade, by
1992. The 1992 Program was a monumental legislative undertaking,
one which required not merely a more autonomous supranational
legislative procedure but also fundamental changes in the Member
States' substantive approach to the question of harmonization.94 The
91. On the "veto culture," see Teasdale, supra note 17.
92. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 ("SEA") (signed at
Luxembourg on Feb. 17, 1986; signed at the Hague on Feb. 28, 1986; entered
into force on July 1, 1987). For a consolidated version of the EEC Treaty after
the entry into force of the SEA, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Treaties Establishing the European Communities 207 (1987).
93. See COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET (White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final, 1985), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/pdf/1985_0310LLen.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2003).
94. Rather than force costly harmonization of technical standards, the
Member States decided to follow the ECJ's lead by adopting a "new approach
to technical harmonization" based on the mutual recognition principle of the
Cassis de Dijon decision. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
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subsequent legislative push to achieve the single market by 1992
through "minimal harmonization" entailed an extensive sub-
delegation of normative power to the Commission in order to fill in
the regulatory details. This in turn led to the vast expansion of the
"comitology system," or the committee system dominated by
national technocrats, which oversaw the Commission's exercise of
its delegated normative power.
95
There are two ways to interpret the post-1986 changes. First,
one may argue that, taken together, they constituted a major
"constitutionalizing" step on the part of the Member States
themselves, establishing a relatively autonomous legislative process
at the supranational level that was in some way representative of a
new political community that could not be understood in exclusively
national terms. The Single European Act had removed the most
serious obstacle to supranational legislation by instituting qualified-
majority voting in the Council in most important matters (notably the
achievement of the internal market) and perhaps even more
significantly had also increased the involvement of a now popularly-
elected Parliament through the introduction of the cooperation
procedure. The Community thus seemed to be moving toward the
establishment of a genuine parliamentary system at the supranational
level, while also actively pursuing the goal of achieving the internal
market by 1992, delegating extensive normative powers to the
Commission to achieve this task.
Nevertheless, the better way of interpreting these changes, I
believe, avoids the conceptual language of supranational
constitutionalism and instead views them as reflective of changes in
the nature of administrative governance both nationally and
supranationally over the same period. Like the earlier development
of European institutions, the move toward increased supranational
technocratic autonomy in the Community in the middle 1980s and
throughout the 1990s-particularly the increasing importance of the
Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 [Cassis de
Dijon]; see also Communication from the Commission Concerning the
Consequences of the Judgment Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February
1979 in Case 120/78 ('Cassis de Dijon'), 1980 O.J. (C256) 2.
95. See generally EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
POLITICS (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999) [hereinafter EU
COMMITTEES].
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comitology system-merely extended upon developments also
taking place in national administrative states. In France and Britain,
for example, there was the increasing recourse to, or experimentation
with, decentralized administrative control as the principal means of
market regulation, through autorits administratives ind4pendantes
and quasi-autonomous regulatory offices. In Germany, the
complexity of modem administration began to overwhelm the old
notion of a hierarchically-controlled "chancellor democracy,"
leading some commentators to speak instead merely of a
"coordination democracy," in which the chancellor served only as a
policy manager at the center of a highly pluralist institutional
network.
96
All of these national developments reflected the broader
recognition that the Western European administrative state's old
dependence on the executive's direct hierarchical political control
over regulatory action was ill-adapted to the management of modem
capitalism, which necessitated both greater decentralization as well
as regulatory and institutional experimentation. With these moves
toward greater administrative autonomy, however, the disconnect
intensified between the prevailing notions of democracy (at least as
reformulated in the postwar decades, with their dependence on the
plebiscitarian leadership of the chief executive)97 and the reality of
ever-more diffuse and fragmented administrative governance in the
1980s and 1990s. In the postwar constitutional settlement, the
executive's plebiscitarian leadership and hierarchical oversight (or at
least responsibility) had given the modem administrative state the
veneer of democratic legitimacy traditionally conceived. Now the
evolving forms of administrative governance in the 1980s and 1990s
could no longer be understood in strictly hierarchical terms, subject
to executive oversight and control. The result, I suggest, was
increasing popular anxiety during this period over technocratic
autonomy, an anxiety which manifested itself especially at the
supranational level. The specter of de Gaulle's worst nightmare-
governance by truly "stateless technocrats" (technocrates
apatrides)-made the democratic anxieties about the changing
96. See generally Stephan Padgett, Introduction to HEIDRUN ABROMEIT ET
AL., ADENAUER TO KOHL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN
CHANCELLORSHIP 18-19 n. 19 (Stephan Padgett, ed., 1994).
97. See Paradox, supra note 33, Part IV.
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direction of administrative governance felt more acutely in the
supranational realm; hence the constant refrain that the Community
suffered from a "democratic deficit."
How did European public law respond to these concerns? In
some sense, paradoxically, the first line of defense was through
qualified-majority voting itself. The Member State executives were
arguably willing to risk the relative degree of regulatory autonomy
that qualified-majority voting entailed precisely because such voting
in the Council restored some semblance of intergovernmental control
to the harmonization of technical non-tariff barriers to trade, which
to date had effectively been controlled by the ECJ in its free
movement of goods jurisprudence.98 Furthermore, qualified-majority
voting also led to the insertion of other mechanisms-comitology,
subsidiarity, the pillar structure, "flexibility"--that were aimed at
reinforcing (with varying degrees of success) indirect national
control over the substantive content of supranationally-created
norms.
All these changes in European public law attempted to strike a
similar balance: On the one hand, they attempted to maintain some
measure of national control over the process of supranational norm-
production, even if indirectly. (Indeed, one might fairly understand
the expansion of the legislative-veto powers of the European
Parliament as creating simply one more constraint on the
Commission's autonomous normative power. The net effect is to
favor the national regulatory status quo by making it more difficult to
legislate at the Community level.) 99 On the other hand, these
changes reflected the realization, born of experience under the old
unanimity regime, that the construction of the single market requires
98. As a prominent European jurist and professor of law has put it, the post-
1986 approach of minimal harmonization, when combined with qualified-
majority voting, "was better than the alternative of letting the judicial process
continue to make the necessary policy choices incrementally .... In other
words, Member States were led to prefer political legislation, even at the risk
of being pushed into the minority on a vote concluding Council deliberations
among the Member States, to a kind of "creeping legislation" through the
judicial process, to which they were completely external." Koen Lenaerts,
Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 93, 110-11.
99. Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicoladis, Keynote Article: Federalist
Ideals and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty ofAmsterdam, 36 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 21 (1998).
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some measure of rulemaking autonomy at the supranational level in
order to overcome the inevitable collective-action problems that the
Member States otherwise face.100
The resort to indirect mechanisms of control after 1986 arguably
reflected, in other words, a desire to update the old forms of
instrumental supranationalism and mediated legitimacy to meet new
regulatory demands, rather than a willingness on the part of the
Member States to bind themselves to the concept of autonomous
constitutional supranationalism. This resort to a modified form of
instrumental supranationalism and mediated legitimacy arguably
contradicted the central claim of constitutional supranationalists: that
the European Union had somehow become a federal system in which
two levels of legitimate "constitutional government"-one national,
one supranational-were now interacting. Rather, the insertion of
these discretion-constraining features into EU law suggests that the
Member States still very much saw themselves as the constitutional
principals in the Union's political and legal system, and therefore
also as the source of its legitimacy. From this perspective, the
supranational institutions of the Union continue to act as rulemaking
agents of the Member States, with an admittedly wide latitude in the
regulatory domains delegated to them (like an independent,
administrative "fourth branch of government"), 1 1 but without any
autonomous constitutional legitimacy of their own.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A "TRANSNATIONAL" CONSTITUTIONAL
SETTLEMENT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?
It is too early to tell whether the proposed constitutional treaty
will overcome the historical contradiction between the administrative
and constitutional dimensions of integration that has marked
100. For a political expression of this aim, consider this passage from
Frangois Mitterrand's speech before the European Parliament in 1984:
How can the complex and diversified entity which the Community has
become be governed by rules like those of the old Diet of the
Kingdom of Poland, where every member could block decisions? It is
time we returned to a more normal and promising way of doing
things.... The more frequent practice of voting on important
questions heralds a return to the Treaties.
Teasdale, supra note 17, at 572-73 (quoting European Parliament, 1984 O.J.
(Annex 1-314) 261 (May 24, 1984) (Debates of European Parliament)).
101. Majone, The European Community, supra note 6, at 23.
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European supranationalism since its inception. As of this writing,' 02
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) established to consider the
work of the Convention has yet to meet, and it would not be
surprising if the IGC introduced significant changes into the
proposed treaty before submitting it for national ratification. There
is strong evidence, for example, that there remains a good deal of
instrumentalist "politics of bureaucratic structure"'1 3 to play itself
out, with demands over the substance of European integration being
intimately linked to negotiations over decision-making procedures
and the distribution of powers.'14
Even without any changes, however, my sense is that the
proposed treaty would do little to alter the position of national
institutions as, effectively, the constitutional "principals" in the
European system (rather than some hypothetical European "people,"
or "demos"). 10 5 It is thus questionable whether the treaty would
create a genuinely autonomous constitutional legitimacy at the
supranational level, as representative of a new political community
beyond the nation-states which comprise it, thus freeing Union
institutions from forms of nationally-mediated legitimation. As a
regulatory mechanism, despite the high hopes of European
federalists going back a half-century, supranational institutions have
never really enjoyed anything more than a kind of "technocratic"
legitimacy rooted in their capacity to generate sound policy
outcomes, supplemented by a (judicially-enforced) "legal"
legitimacy derived from their operation within the lawful bounds of
102. September 2003.
103. See Moe, supra note 48, and accompanying text.
104. In the face of critiques that smaller Member States and candidate
countries have leveled against the proposed treaty (see supra note 20), larger
Member States have warned that any effort to rewrite the constitutional treaty
would inevitably have an impact on budget negotiations for the following year.
See Judy Dempsey, Germany Warns on EU Constitution, FiNANCIAL TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2003), at http://www.FT.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
105. Of course, there is much in the current treaty that is undeniably
constitutionalist-for example, the incorporation of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights into the positive treaty law of the Union. The presence of
the Charter can only serve to reinforce the ECJ's rights-based jurisprudence
that has provided the foundation of the constitutionalization of European




their delegated power.'0 6 The institutions of the Member States, on
the other hand, have remained the locus of democratic and
constitutional legitimacy in Europe, even as significant normative
power has been transferred to the supranational level, leaving
supranational institutions with a correspondingly "weak" legitimacy
by comparison. 1
07
The new constitutional treaty does not appear to alter this reality
significantly, or at least it is unlikely to do so by fiat. With or
without the constitutional treaty, the process of European integration
will likely continue to muddle along, "a novelty in want of a
convincing label,"'1 8 one involving extensive delegation of
normative power to the supranational level but with constitutional
legitimacy remaining largely national. Is this the makings of a proto-
"federal" polity? Or is it simply a supranational manifestation of
administrative governance (that is, the diffusion of power to
administrative institutions without any autonomous constitutional
legitimacy of their own)? Although European integration has clearly
involved contradictory elements of both constitutionalization and
administrative governance, my sense is that the socio-legal character
of the EU tips in favor of the latter, and any durable constitutional
settlement will need to take this reality into account.
It is for this reason that the idea of the Union as a system of
"transnational governance"--a view that has gained increasing
adherents in recent yearsl'9-provides a promising conceptual terrain
on which to develop a sophisticated understanding of the relationship
between national constitutional orders and supranational regulatory
processes. The transnational interpretation emphasizes the extensive
normative power and relative autonomy of the supranational
regulatory system but also recognizes, as one commentator has
written, that "democracy is fundamentally a demos-bound concept
106. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A
Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-
Gord6n eds., 1999).
107. See generally "Weak" Constitutionalism?, supra note 4.
108. Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts:
The German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3
COLUM. J. EuR. L. 229, 229 (1997).
109. See, for example, the various contributions in EU COMMITTEES, supra
note 95.
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(which cannot be easily translated to the European Community)."
' 10
From this perspective, the European Union should be understood as a
complex system of institutional actors at multiple levels (national,
subnational, and supranational), as well as of various types (public,
quasi-public, and private), each of which takes part in the production
of regulatory norms in the single market. At the core of this
institutional "network," a sociological concept central to the
transnationalist perspective, is an interlocking system of national
administrative authorities that use supranational channels (the
comitology system, most notably) to develop new forms of
rulemaking and/or enforcement cooperation in Europe."'
The detailed proposals that advocates of the transnational
perspective advance to legitimize the normative output of these
transnational networks-transparency, participation, reasoned
decision-making, a measure of parliamentary monitoring (national
and European), as well as more traditional ministerial oversight-
often read like they are drawn from a treatise in modem
administrative law. And why not? Their object is a rulemaking
process that is, at its core, essentially administrative--even if highly
political. By this I mean that it involves the exercise of delegated
normative power within largely technocratic institutions that do not
enjoy constitutional legitimacy of their own, corresponding to their
own demos-based political community. 12 Such a community may
emerge in Europe over time-indeed, the creation of European
institutions may slowly help to bring that community into being' 13
but until that time, constitutional legitimacy will remain largely
national, leaving the diffuse and fragmented character of Europe's
supranational regulatory system as primarily administrative.
110. Jiirgen Neyer, The Comitology Challenge to Analytical Integration
Theory, in EU COMMITTEES, supra note 95, at 231.
11. Id.
112. For further discussion, see "Weak" Constitutionalism?, supra note 4.
113. More likely, what will call it into being will be widespread opposition
to some perceived external threat. It is for this reason that George Bush may
have, ironically, done more to advance the emergence of a common European
"demos" than any living European in recent memory. The widespread public
opposition to the Bush administration's policy in Iraq (even in those countries,
like Italy, Spain, and Poland, whose leaders supported the President) may well
signify the beginnings of a coherent European "public" transcending national
borders, linguistic differences, and national histories, which is defined, in
important respects, in opposition to American power in a unipolar world.
